



Simplified report of safety investigation

**COLLISION BETWEEN *SALVATORE CAFIERO*
AND *NAUSICAA* ON 22 APRIL 2012
IN THE WESTERN APPROACHES TO THE ENGLISH CHANNEL**

Bureau d'enquêtes sur les événements de mer

Report published on : July 2013

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VESSELS AND CREWS

NAUSICAA



NAUSICAA is a steel hulled trawler, built in 1994. She flies the French flag.

Registration : PL 878368;
Radio call sign : FKJW;
Length overall : 24.48 meters;
Width : 7.41 meters;
Gross tonnage : 168.70 UMS;
Main engine : CATERPILLAR 738 kW.

She is fitted for the 2nd category (deep sea fishery). Her freeboard certificate and her navigation licence were valid.

Her complement, in accordance with the safe-manning certificate issued on 04 November 2011, was made of seven sailors: a skipper, a first officer, a chief engineer and four hands.

The skipper, 50 year old, holds a captain 200 certificate; his annual medical certificate was valid.

The first officer, 34 year old, holds a fishing vessel first officer certificate; his annual medical certificate was valid.

SALVATORE CAFIERO



SALVATORE CAFIERO is an ore carrier built in 2001. She flies the Italian flag.

IMO registration : 9183221;
Radio call sign : IBTW;
Length overall : 225 meters;
Width : 32.26 meters;
Deadweight capacity : 75,668 metric tons.

She was loaded with 73,886 metric tons of coal from Norfolk (USA) bound to Antwerp (Belgium).

Her complement was made of 22 crewmembers.

THE FACTS

Local time (UTC+1)

Weather conditions (SITREP) : south-westerly wind 6 to 7 Beaufort, sea state 4 moderate, visibility 10 miles.

On **22 April 2012**, *NAUSICAA* was heading 355° at 8 knots, towards her fishing grounds and *SALVATORE CAFIERO* was heading 073° at 13.2 knots, bound to Antwerp.

They collided at **5.24 pm**, at 38 miles in the bearing 140° from Cap Lizard, in position 49° 30' N and 004° 35' W.

No-one was injured in this accident.

BEAmer investigators did neither meet *SALVATORE CAFIERO* crewmembers, nor get the VDR records. The collision analysis has been established from the cargo vessel master's sea protest transmitted to CORSEN MRCC and from the statement of *NAUSICAA* man on watch.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

On **22 April 2012**, *NAUSICAA* skipper and first officer joined the vessel after a week on leave. The vessel sailed from Roscoff harbour at **10.30 am** in company with the trawler *HERMINE* (same owner) bound to their fishing grounds.

At **4.30 pm**, the skipper decided to have a rest one hour before the arrival on the fishing grounds estimated around 6.00 pm. The first officer took over the bridge watch.

NAUSICAA was heading 350°/355° under autopilot at 8 knots. At this time she was located between the north-eastbound traffic and the south-westbound traffic and between the Off Casquets TSS and the Off Ushant TSS.

HERMINE was about 2 miles ahead.

Both radars were on, one on a 3 mile scale and the other on a 6 mile scale, connected with the ARPA. No anti-collision sound alarm was activated on any of the two radars.

The AIS was activated. The anti-collision sound alarm, set on 0,5 mile, was activated according to the skipper's statement, but it was not according to the first officer taking on the watch.

Around **4.40 pm**, VHF channel 16 contact with a first vessel coming from the south-westbound lane of Casquets TSS heading to Ushant. *NAUSICAA* manoeuvred to cross aft then resumed her course towards her fishing grounds.

Around **5.00 pm**, on board *SALVATORE CAFIERO* heading 073° at 13.2 knots, the first officer, in charge of the bridge watch, plotted two blips and identified visually, on his starboard side, two fishing vessels at about 5 miles heading 358° at 8 knots.

He took a bearing of FV *NAUSICAA*, read 115° and he assessed that she should cross aft at 3 cables (550 meters).

He observed that there was no vessel engaged in fishing shapes.

The first officer called *NAUSICAA* by VHF to know her intentions. No answer from the latter.

Two calls had been heard on VHF channel 16 by the skipper of the trawler *HERMINE*.

He stated to have sounded twice a whistle signal with the fog horn (which means, according to COLREG Rule 34 a, "*I am altering my course to port*»).

The manoeuvre is not known precisely, but the initial heading was 073° and her course at the time of the collision was 350°/355°.

At **5.03 pm**, CORSEN MRCC broadcast on VHF channel 16 a coastal weather report and gale warning.

As he was not interested with this weather report, the man in charge of the watch on board *NAUSICAA* reduced to zero the sound level of his VHF device. The sound level remained shut off until the collision.

Around **5.15 pm**, the man on watch turned on the echo sounder. He did not wake up the skipper because he assessed that he was at twenty minutes from the fishing grounds.

At this moment, he saw on his portside at a few meters the black and red side of a cargo vessel that was overtaking him heading a parallel course (350°/355°).

As he was in the centre of the bridge he was unable to appreciate the size of the cargo vessel. He disengaged the autopilot and put the helm hard-a-starboard.

At **5.24 pm**, *NAUSICAA* collided *SALVATORE CAFIERO* amidships at the level of the number 4 hold on starboard.

This manoeuvre launched violently *NAUSICAA* stern on the portside so that she hit the cargo vessel side with her gantry.

This impact, combined with the relative speed (8 and 13.2 knots), with *NAUSICAA* turning in progress and with a south-westerly chop, had the effect of a 90° turn leading to collide *SALVATORE CAFIERO* with the fore part of her port bow.

NAUSICAA man on watch instantly reduced the propeller pitch and put the helm back to 10° on starboard.

The skipper, back on the bridge, observed that *SALVATORE CAFIERO* was on the portside at about fifty meters. He took back the manoeuvre and asked the engineer for a damage assessment.


SALVATORE CAFIERO proposed, by VHF, her assistance to *NAUSICAA*, which the latter declined.

Some distortions were observed on the hull. She resumed her voyage to Antwerp.

The skipper of *NAUSICAA* decided to head for Saint-Malo.

At **6.30 pm**, he reported the event to Corsen MRCC.

He came alongside at Saint-Malo on the day after **23 April 2012** at **8.40 am**.



ANALYSIS

On board the ore carrier, the officer of the watch detected, on his starboard side, *NAUSICAA* on his radar as well as her course and speed. 24 minutes before the collision, *NAUSICAA* was in position of a stand-on vessel.

Anticipating that a close situation was probable, *SALVATORE CAFIERO*, attempted to communicate with the trawler on VHF channel 16 (which has been confirmed by another vessel in the area) as well as with regulatory sound signals (which has not been confirmed by *NAUSICAA* man on watch).

These communication attempts remaining without any answer, he made the belated choice to alter course to port, contrary to COLREG rule 15. He shifted from the detection of a danger to a manoeuvre, done urgently, which put him in the situation of an overtaking vessel and led to the collision.

As for him, *NAUSICAA* man on watch at the time of the collision, stated:

- that he did not hear the sound signals;
- that he did not hear the two VHF calls broadcast on channel 16 by *SALVATORE CAFIERO*, which were at his intention;
- that he had actually identified a blip at 4 miles on his port bow, heading a northeasterly course, but as he considered himself as a « stand-on-vessel », he did not take it into account.

The lookout done by the man on watch on board the trawler had not been watchful enough as he saw *SALVATORE CAFIERO* only when she was very close.

A VHF channel 16 cover would have allowed him to receive the ore carrier calls and, even despite the lack of lookout, to be informed of the danger.

The skipper do not agree with the first officer about the fact that the anti-collision sound alarm was activated or not.

CONSEQUENCES

Distortions can be observed on and under the deck at the bow, which do not impair the buoyancy of *NAUSICAA*.



A port supporting beam of the gantry had been broken at the level of a weld.




NAUSICAA damage repairs had been done in Saint Malo during a 8 day period.

SALVATORE CAFIERO, hull had some distortions and shows of chafing.

LEARNING

- 1 – [2013-E-059](#): It is obvious that COLREG rules 5, 8a and 15 have not been correctly enforced.

*BEA*mer reminds to men in charge of the watch on board any vessel that they have to comply with COLREG.





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