



# Simplified report of safety investigation

**COLLISION BETWEEN THE TRAWLER *ALYA*  
AND THE CARGO VESSEL *KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV*  
ON 27 SEPTEMBER 2012 OFF PORTSALL (NORTH-BRITTANY)**

Bureau d'enquêtes sur les événements de mer

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## VESSELS

### *ALYA*



*Trawler ALYA on Rosmeur slipway in Douarnenez*

The fishing vessel *ALYA*, registered at Le Guilvinec, registration number GV 785720, is a steel hulled trawler built in 1992.

Length overall: 24.90 meters;

Width: 7.14 meters;

Gross tonnage: 157.67 UMS;

Main engine: 441 kW.

She fishes with a bottom trawl during a maximum of 10 consecutive days. Usually, she sales at Le Guilvinec auction.

The owner of this trawler is Scapêche which operates 5 trawlers and one potter at Le Guilvinec harbour.

*ALYA* is a well maintained vessel. Her last safety visit took place on 29 August 2012.

Her navigation licence, for a 2<sup>nd</sup> category navigation, is valid until 29 August 2013.

Her free-board certificate is valid until 29 August 2013.

### *KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV*



*Cargo vessel KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV*

*KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV*, registered in Panama, is a steel hulled multi-purpose cargo vessel built in 2009.

Length overall: 90 meters;

Width: 14 meters;

Gross tonnage: 2997 UMS;

Main engine: 1950 kW.

In 2012, *KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV* had been subjected to 6 safety inspections in the framework of Paris MOU.

This vessel is well maintained and did not have major follow-up actions to be taken after these visits.

## CREWS

### *ALYA*

The vessel is manned, in accordance with the safe manning certificate issued on 26 décembre 2000, by five crewmembers: a skipper, an engineer, a first deck officer, a greaser and a hand.

*ALYA* skipper holds a captain 500 certificate.

The engineer, in charge of the watch at the time of the events, holds a 750 kW engineer certificate. This certificate gives him the qualification to be the AB in charge of the bridge watch.

Both had a valid medical certificate.

The engineer was fit for « all tasks, all navigations ».

### **KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV**

No information about the crew.

## **THE FACTS**

### **Weather conditions (from Corsen MRCC SITREP)**

Wind 330°/23 knots - sea state 3 – visibility 12 miles.

### **Local times (UTC+2)**

On **Sunday 23 September 2012** at **2.00 pm**, the trawler *ALYA* left Le Guilvinec port bound to her fishing grounds.

On **Monday 24 September 2012**, the trawler *ALYA* began to fish in the south-southwest of the lighthouse of Small (Cornwall – UK).

On **Wednesday 26 September 2012** at **1.30 pm**, because of a mechanical problem, the skipper decided to sail to Roscoff, speed 8.5 knots, northerly wind 40 knots, rough sea.

On **Thursday 27 September 2012** at **0.00 am**, the trawler was located between Longship and the Isles of Scilly, the sea had calmed down, the skipper went in his cabin for a rest. He had laid off the course on the Turbo 2000 navigation system display and left the instruction to wake him up at 7.30 am.

At **5.00 am**, the engineer took over the watch. The vessel was under auto-pilot, heading 145°, speed 10.5 knots. The AIS anti-collision alarm was activated but the alarm of the radar was not. The « dead-man control » system was activated, locked, and the key had been removed. It was set on 6 minutes.

At **6.43 am**, the trawler, underway on the portside of *KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV*, crossed 0.3 mile ahead of the latter. Then she circled.

At **6.45 am**, the trawler collided the cargo vessel in the area of her bridge on her starboardside. As a result of the impact, the skipper and the hands had been ejected from their berths. The man on watch

did not react. Due to the inertia, the stern of the trawler cast towards the hull of the cargo vessel and her portside bumped four times into the merchant vessel.

The skipper got to the bridge and backed the engine in order to move away, then he tried to contact Corsen MRCC on channel 16, but the link was poor.

At **6.50 am**, the skipper came into contact with the cargo vessel master. They questioned each other about their respective damages. There has been no wounded on board the vessels.

The skipper carried out a survey of the vessel and noticed a water leak in the engine room, located between the electric board and the fuel oil centrifuge. The stripping pump which has been started coped with the leak.

At **6.56 am**, Corsen MRCC received a MF 2182 call from the potter *ASKARRA* relaying an HF call from the trawler *ALYA* reporting the collision with the cargo vessel *KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV*.

At **7.10 am**, in agreement with Corsen MRCC, the skipper of *ALYA* decided to haul in for Douarnez port.

*ASKARRA* escorted *ALYA* who had been reporting her position to Corsen MRCC every twenty minutes, precising her position, her course, her speed and the water leak monitoring. Corsen MRCC operated the rescue boat SNS 064 from Aber Wrac'h.

At **8.00 am**, the skipper reported the situation to the owner by INMARSAT C.

At **10.25 am**, Corsen MRCC gave freedom of movement to *ASKARRA*. SNS 064 took over the escort.

At **11.53 am**, the rescue boat SNS 097 sailed from Camaret.

At **1.21 pm**, SNS 097 arrived in the area and took over the escort; Corsen MRCC gave freedom of movement to SNS 064.

At **6.00 pm**, *ALYA* came alongside in Douarnez port.

## **CONSÉQUENCES**

*ALYA* bow and bulb were dented.

Distorsions were visible on her portside with shell plates warped and framing altered.

The necessary repairs had immediately begun for a two month period.


Aboard *KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV*, in the bridge area, stanchions and guard rods were twisted, plates were dented, the floor of the alleyway was distorted.

This vessel had been inspected on 08 octobres 2012 at Ust Luga (Baltic Sea), then she hauled in for Saint-Petersburg to repair.

## OBSERVATIONS

The trawler *ALYA*, under auto-pilot, had on her starboardside the portside of the cargo vessel *KAPITAN ZHIKHAREV*, whose navigation lights were visible.

The enforcement of the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea rule 15: « *When two power-driven vessel are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her starboard side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.* », should have led the trawler *ALYA* to cross abaft the cargo vessel.



*Tracks of the vessels*

The AIS anti-collision alarm actuation should have drawn the man on watch's attention.

The trawler crossed at 0.3 mile ahead of the cargo vessel because the latter reduced her speed from 9.2 knots to 7.3 knots in order to give her way. The lookout was thus maintained on the cargo vessel bridge.

After he had crossed the track of the cargo vessel, the man on watch shifted the wheel to manual and undertook a manoeuvre. The trawler circled and came to collide the cargo vessel in the area of the bridge on the starboardside. During this manoeuvre, the AIS anti-collision alarm actuated again.

The manoeuvre undertaken which resulted in the collision with the cargo vessel was due to an error of judgement.

The man on watch has only been able to give confusing explanations about this manoeuvre.

When she is fishing the trawler *ALYA* does 3 to 4 hour long trawl haul. The crew is generally aboard during two consecutive 10 day periods at sea with a short port call between these periods in order to unload fish and to provision. These two periods are followed by a 10 day leave period.

The AB who was in charge of the watch at the time of the collision is also in charge of the tasks of the engineer, the cook and a deck hand. On the day before the event, he had to face many mechanical failures, causes of the return of the vessel.

He joined on the 30 August. In addition he had worked two more days in order to prepare the vessel before the departure.

Consequently, he had been aboard for nearly one month. He should have been relieved but the engineer who should have relieved him had been impeded.

During the month of August he had some sight therapy sessions.

The engineer 750 kW certificate he holds, allows him to be in charge of the bridge watch.

## CONCLUSIONS

Despite his qualifications and his experience, the man on watch did not correctly analyse the situation, which led to judgement errors behind the collision.

The collision can be explained by the tiredness caused by a full month aboard and by sight problems.

## LEARNINGS

### To fishing vessel skippers

- 1 - 2013-E-039 : Before they hand over the watch, skippers have to check the relieving man's capability to carry out the watch, given his state of tiredness.

### To physicians in charge of seafarers

- 2 - 2013-E-040 : This accident reveals a visual acuity deficiency that had not been detected during the annual medical visit.

### To fishing vessel owners

- 3 - 2013-E-041 : The regulation related to leave and rest periods have to be enforced.



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